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from the Department of State, shall be communicated, the subject will be fairly and adequately discussed, and that some compromise, satisfactory to the claimants, and not onerous to the country, will take place.

ART. VIII.—*Ensayo sobre la Necesidad de una Federacion Jeneral entre los Estados Hispano-Americanos, y Plan de su Organizacion. Obra Póstuma del H. CORONEL D. BERNARDO MONTEAGUDO. Lima. 1825.*

THE alliance about to be established between the new American republics, by the delegates assembled at the Isthmus of Panamá, may with justice be considered among the most remarkable events of political history. Confederacies between independent states, for the purpose of consulting and supporting the common interest, have existed from early times. The governments of ancient Greece had their mutual compacts, their long sustained council of Amphictyons, and their renowned Achæan league; some of the minor states of modern Europe have from time to time followed their example; and we behold at this day, the colossal powers of the old world linked together to maintain their dominion, nay, to secure their safety. The influence of these confederacies has been important, in proportion to their extent and their objects, but none of them has existed under circumstances so imposing, or been instituted on principles so broad and just in their political bearings, or been calculated to affect so deeply and widely the destiny of future generations, as that about to be formed by the Congress of Panamá.

Polybius tells us, that it was the boast of the Achæan league, while the wise and politic Aratus was at its head, to be founded on the basis of equality and liberty, and that to this were mainly to be ascribed its strength and its increase. But every one knows what was Grecian liberty, even in the best days of Grecian prosperity. The balance, between the rights of the people, and the power of the rulers, was never well adjusted; the laws of nations were not understood, because practised on a narrow scale; commerce, that great

instrument in drawing out the principles, and settling the rules of national intercourse, was hardly known. In short, liberty was too often the watchword of those, who desired freedom from law rather than from tyranny ; and the cry of equality was a signal for levelling the fabric of power, as sustained by an existing government, that the schemes of ambition and misrule might be raised on its ruins. These defects, and others of a collateral nature, interwoven with the very texture of political institutions denominated republican, not only in Greece, but in other countries of Europe at later periods, have presented obstacles to any well organised confederacy in governments of this kind in the old world, which would bring the combined power and wisdom of the whole, to act for the mutual and equal benefit of the parts.

If we look at confederated despotisms, we find things in a still worse condition. Who has ever dreamt, that it was the aim of the present allied sovereigns of Europe, to lift a finger towards aiding the progress of the mind, or human improvement in anything, which implies freedom of thought, or scope of inquiry ? All their acts declare the contrary, and prove this alliance to be a conspiracy against the liberty, as it is an outrage upon the rights of mankind. It is a combination to perpetuate ignorance, delusion, and slavery ; to stop the current of public opinion, and let in upon the mind anew the Stygian waters of the dark ages ; to make men bigots in the false creed of legitimacy, and infidels to the pure faith of reason and truth, liberty and right. Let public opinion be brought to this standard, and it is wisely judged, that it can be moulded to any shape, and impelled in any direction. Teach men to forget their rights, and abandon self respect, and you have no more to do to make them fit subjects for dragging the chains of slavery. The sovereigns of Europe are allied to prop up half a dozen tottering thrones, whose gothic structure is the mockery of an enlightened age like this, and to aggrandise half a dozen crowned heads, not merely at the expense of the independence of a hundred millions of the human race, but at the immensely greater sacrifice of retarding the progress of nations in those arts of self government, of which the human character and condition are susceptible, which afford the broadest foundation for all the advantages to be derived from the social compact, and

which are advancing so rapidly in every part of the world, where the shackles of antiquated forms are not felt.

The confederacy of Panamá is formed under auspices totally different from any, which have before existed. It has no prototype in the annals either of ancient or modern story. A hemisphere of the globe has become freed from the yoke of bondage, by hard struggles and by an energy, which only the spirit of freedom could inspire. The soil, which for three centuries was made sterile by the poisoned breath of tyranny, now gives growth and vigor to six great republics, as well organised as the circumstances of each will admit, and having for their basis the genuine principles of political liberty and justice. To give stability to these institutions; to remedy the numerous defects, which in their present stage they must necessarily possess; to consult and advance the common interests of twenty millions of people; to provide means of defence against aggression from without, and commotion from within; to secure peace and prosperity at home, and importance and respect abroad; to settle on definite grounds those political maxims, which for ages unnumbered will regulate the intercourse of nations, whose infancy will soon grow into a powerful manhood; to concert all the plans, in short, which wisdom can devise, and union execute, for increasing the strength and prosperity of every branch of the confederacy; these are some of the points to be considered at the Congress of Panamá. The spectacle of such a body, assembled for such a purpose, is not more novel than imposing; its members are literally the legislators of a continent; and it was a just remark of Bolivar, that this event 'will form a memorable era in the diplomatic history of America, and a hundred ages hence, when posterity seeks the origin of the international law of the southern republics, she will consult the records of the proceedings in the Isthmus.' Viewed in this light, and it is certainly the true light, the Congress of Panamá is an object of deep interest to all parts of the American continent, and although our own government is at present widely separated from the sphere of its action, yet it must necessarily, at a future day, participate largely of the influence of its measures.

In touching on this subject at present, we aim at nothing more, than to state a few historical facts, with very brief

remarks on the general purposes of the Congress of Panamá, reserving for a future occasion a discussion of its direct policy and designs, as these may be more fully developed. The project of a union between the new governments of the south, seems to have been early conceived by some of the leaders of the revolutionary contest, as a step highly important and desirable, but the first who undertook the business of carrying it into execution was Bolivar. If it succeeds, as its friends anticipate, he must be regarded the Aratus of the league. Till Peru had shaken off the yoke of the Royalists in 1821, so far at least as to set up a nominally independent government under San Martin, which it has since confirmed and maintained, and until Mexico had escaped from the folly and tyranny of her mock emperor Iturbide, it was obvious that any plan of confederacy between the other states could not be accomplished, with a prospect of permanency or advantage. But in 1823, when the power of Old Spain was virtually destroyed in South America, and each republic began to stand firm on its own basis, Bolivar, as President of Colombia, formally invited the governments of Mexico, Peru, Chile, and Buenos Ayres, to send delegates to the Isthmus of Panamá, or to any other place that might be agreed on, with the express design of establishing the confederacy, and proceeding in their deliberations, as the instructions and united wisdom of the parties might dictate. This invitation was promptly accepted by Mexico and Peru, and an agreement, in the nature of a treaty, was entered into by each with the plenipotentiaries from Colombia, containing a mutual pledge to send delegates to the confederate Congress. Chile and Buenos Ayres delayed joining the compact, for reasons not well known, nor does it appear, that they have yet determined to take a part by their representatives in the convention. The obstacles to their union are probably of a local and transient nature, which will in due time be removed, and the way be left open for them to come into the compact.

In this stage of the undertaking, as it was necessary for some one government to take the lead in its further prosecution, Bolivar sent a circular to all the republics, dated at Lima, December 7, 1824, recapitulating what had been done, and proposing, that delegates should immediately be

sent to Panamá, by those governments which had agreed to join in the confederacy, suggesting that they ought not, out of courtesy to the delinquents, to delay any longer to profit by the advantages, which it was confidently believed would be derived from such a convention. The governments of Colombia and Mexico promptly acceded to this request of the Liberator of Peru, and two delegates from each of these countries proceeded to the place of destination. It is presumed, also, that the republic of Guatamala will join the confederacy at the outset, and send its representatives.

The preliminary steps of the Congress are indicated by Santander, Vice President of Colombia, in his reply to Bolívar's circular. It is there proposed, that the governments of Colombia and Peru should authorise their plenipotentiaries, as soon as they arrive at Panamá, to enter into a direct correspondence with the other republics, acquainting them that conferences had commenced, and renewing the invitation for each to send representatives. That these same plenipotentiaries should have power to select such a place, as they should think proper, in the Isthmus of Panamá, for their preparatory conferences. And, again, that whenever delegates from Mexico, Guatamala, Colombia, and Peru, or from any three of these republics, should be convened, they should have power to install the assembly of confederate delegates, and proceed to the business for which they were convened. It is moreover stated, in the letters of the President of Mexico, and the Vice President of Colombia, that each of these governments, through their ministers plenipotentiary in Washington, had invited the government of the United States to take part in the deliberations at Panamá.

Such is a very brief history of the origin of this assembly ; future events must unfold the character and extent of its doings. Meantime we hasten to a few observations on its proposed objects, as far as these can be understood, from the hitherto imperfect expositions of the parties themselves, and from the political condition and interests of the several republics. The pamphlet, whose title is prefixed to this article, and which was published at Lima within the last twelve months, affords some hints on this subject ; and although it bears marks of haste, and is crude in composition, it is on the whole drawn up with a good deal of ability, and

manifests in the writer a deep knowledge of South American politics. It comes out as the posthumous work of Monteagudo, and this may be the true story of its origin, although the testimony in the preface is no more, than the assertion of an anonymous writer. It is a point of no consequence, however, who was the author of the pamphlet, as it treats of topics in no degree affected by the authority, from which the discussion of their merits proceeds. The name of Monteagudo is sufficiently notorious in the recent history of South American affairs, particularly in Chile and Peru. He raised himself from obscurity by the force of his talents, and his address, and acted a most conspicuous part in the strange drama of San Martin's political career. In Peru he was entrusted with almost absolute power by San Martin, but he used it for purposes, which have been condemned in the severest terms by those, who profess to be acquainted with his conduct. At all events, the people became so much exasperated with his proceedings, that he was compelled by their united clamors to leave the government, while San Martin was yet in Peru. From that time he lived as a private citizen till last January, when he was assassinated in the streets of Lima.

Here we will dismiss the supposed author of the pamphlet, and turn to the hints it contains on the Congress of Panamá. Three great points are said to claim the devoted and united attention of all the republics, and these are *independence*, *peace*, and *security*. To establish independence, preserve peace, and form a system of mutual guaranties, are objects equally essential to the prosperity, and even existence, of all the new governments, and such as can only be attained, in the most effectual manner, by a Congress, in which each shall be represented, and which shall proffer reciprocal support, fix the rules of national intercourse, and reconcile national dissensions. In his circular to the republics, Bolivar describes the Congress as a body, which may 'act as a council to us in our distresses, as a rallying point in our common danger, as a faithful interpreter of our public treaties when difficulties occur, and, in fine, as a mediator in all our differences.' This summary embraces all that can be desired from a confederacy, and it only remains to inquire what are the details, and whether they are practicable.

The thing of primary and vital importance to the South American Republics is their *independence*, and in this each one of them has an equal concern. Without independence, in short, they could not exist, and no sacrifices can be too great, no precaution superfluous, which shall have a tendency to establish this on an unshaken foundation. Where a common enemy is to be feared, whose designs are equally hostile to each republic, common prudence would dictate, that the best pledge of security would be in the united wisdom, resources, and strength of the whole. The only possible mode of effecting this union, of applying these resources, is by a Congress of delegates from the respective governments, authorised to concert proper measures, and to become responsible for supplying such a portion of the means for carrying them into operation, as may fall to the lot of each, or as exigences may require. All the reasons might here be adduced in favor of a general Congress, which were so powerfully urged by Jay and Hamilton in the *Federalist*, when they insisted on a union of our States, as the best security against foreign invasion. If you would preserve peace, let it be seen, that you are prepared to meet, and have power to resist, an enemy.

The South Americans would not seem longer to have grounds for fear, that any further attacks will be made on them by a foreign foe, yet they are doubtless wise to keep on the side of caution. The arm of Old Spain is paralysed, not more in the new world, than in the old. The brilliant victory of Ayacucho severed the last thread of her dominion on the western continent, and wrested from her hand forever the sceptre of power, which she first acquired by bloodshed and treachery, and which for three centuries she has wielded only as an instrument of oppression. The last remnants of her prostrated forces are now collected at San Juan de Ulloa, a small island on the coast of Mexico; at the castle of Callao, the port of Lima, under the semibarbarous Rodil; and at Chiloe, in the southern borders of Chile. In these retreats their insignificance protects them, and from these they would soon be driven, were it possible for them to gain such accessions of strength, as to make them otherwise than insignificant.

In this state of things it is manifest, that all actual danger from Old Spain has ceased, and as far as that humbled

nation is concerned, the independence of the new world is secured. But the South Americans say, and perhaps justly, that her pride is not subdued, although her physical force is crushed, and that the spirit of revenge is stifled, not quenched, but slumbers to burst forth with increased fury, should her strength be revived. She will set up pretensions, and call them rights, and fortify them with records, decrees, and traditions, till the series terminates in the famous bull of Pope Alexander the Sixth, making over to Ferdinand and Isabella all the western world beyond a certain line, drawn from pole to pole through such points, as his Holiness was pleased to designate. The obstinacy, that has struggled for several years in a contest, which all the world has seen must end, as it has done, in defeat and disgrace to Spain, is too blind to see the reality at first, and too inveterate to be reclaimed by reason, justice, or common prudence. It will seize the first opportunity to renew its rashness, which accident or the progress of events may throw in its way, and which shall communicate the faintest gleam of life to a lingering hope.

Moreover, the Holy Alliance exhibits an aspect, which the South Americans are disposed to contemplate with much suspicion. Not that this formidable combination has anything in America, which can rightfully claim its attention, but the melancholy examples of Naples and Spain prove abundantly, that it is ready to meddle where it has no rights, nor proper interests. These kind hearted sovereigns, by their own professions, carried war and death into the Peninsula to make the people happy, and teach them how to manage their own affairs. Who knows how soon the same tender concern may be extended to America? And when this fit of sympathy shall once have taken as deep hold, as it did in the cases of Naples and Spain, why should it not be expected to see the bayonets of their Imperial, Most Catholic, and Most Christian Majesties, teaching the same lessons of happiness and self government to the Mexicans and Colombians, as they have before done with such triumphant success to the Neapolitans and Spaniards? The Holy Alliance exists as a whole, and in its parts, on a name, a shadow, the shadow of *legitimacy*, and when the people shall see what a vain, empty thing it is, the bubble will burst, the charm will be dissolved, and the airy fabric will fall. To keep the peo-

ple in ignorance, therefore, and to suppress by collusion or force the first germs of intelligence and liberty wherever they appear, are among the most essential maxims of this political compact. Nothing but the want of adequate power, and the doubtful nature of the undertaking, would prevent these maxims being applied in America, with as much energy as in Europe. And although nothing can seriously be apprehended, it is prudent, to say the least, that the republics of the new world should be on their guard.

Then, again, there is the new empire of Brazil, bordering by a line of immense length on Colombia, Peru, and Buenos Ayres. It does not yet appear, in what direction this sprig from a royal stock will shoot. The names of emperor, crown, and sceptre, have no charms for American ears, and if the things, as well as the names, are to put forth the same virtues here, that they have done in the old world, it is safe to say, that American ground cannot long be a quiet depository for such symbols of ancient darkness and domination. It is true, that Don Pedro the First has thus far shown a spirit of accommodation to circumstances, which augurs not badly. We are even told of the *independence* of Brazil, and a *constitution*, and these under an emperor ! It will puzzle a republican of the United States to understand a combination of ideas so incongruous. If Don Pedro would become a president, and declare the Brazilians independent not only of Portugal, but of all hereditary forced dominion, whether from abroad or at home, and then give them a constitution recognising an equality of rights, and liberty to choose their own mode of being governed, he might talk in earnest of the independence of Brazil. But till this be done, there never will be any permanently good understanding between that country, and the neighboring states. Jealousies will arise, aggressions be committed, and wars break out. The idle dream of legitimacy will play at times in his Brazilian Majesty's imagination, and the great champions of this phantom in Europe will have succors for an oppressed brother, which may be contributed indirectly, if not directly, to such an extent, as to render him a troublesome neighbor to the adjoining republics. In their relations with Brazil, these governments have a common interest, and such relations may properly be discussed by a general Congress.

Such are some of the advantages, which the cause of South American independence will derive, from a single body of delegates convened from all the states, especially in the first stages of their national existence. The next important step is to secure a permanent *peace*, not only in regard to their standing with foreign nations, but with each other. It is of vast moment, at the outset of their political intercourse, that such measures should be concerted, and maxims adopted, as will be mutually understood and received. By judicious arrangements of this sort, the usual causes of national differences and discord will in a good degree be obviated, a uniformity of thinking on these subjects will gradually diffuse itself through the different parts, and a similarity of habits and opinions prevail. In short, each will see its real interests in their true light, and be ready to make sacrifices, where they are required from another. The governments of South America are all established on precisely the same principles, their condition has hitherto been the same, they have thrown off the same yoke of oppression, and they have before them the same difficulties to encounter in their national progress; they speak the same language, have the same manners, domestic habits, and characteristic peculiarities. It follows, of course, that similar laws and political institutions are strictly applicable to the whole. In this respect there can be no essential difference between Mexico and Chile, Buenos Ayres and Colombia. Yet some of these governments are separated by so wide a distance from others, that the bonds of national sympathy will every day become weaker, distinctive national habits will spring up, and, as in all other nations, not cemented by any local attachments, rival interests will begin to take root, and the seeds of discord to be scattered, and the fair blossoms of peace to be blasted. With every hope realised, the day will come, perhaps, when these evils will have a being, but this is no reason why their causes should not be timely cut off to as great a degree as possible. And since there is such an entire similarity in everything pertaining to the people of these countries, and in the principles of the governments they are constituting, it is evident, that they are in a condition to be guided by one general system, formed by a united voice. And it is moreover evident, that this same harmony of cha-

racter, customs, opinion, and feeling, may be turned to the best account in promoting a universal spirit of conciliation and peace. An assembly of representatives, such as that at Panamá, is the only body, that could frame and give authority to a system, that would be suited to this uniformity of character, condition, and interests.

Peace will be preserved, not only by such a system, adapted alike to the institutions and internal policy of each government, but also by having a tribunal of weight and authority, representing the interests of all parties, to which may be referred national differences, the exposition of doubtful points in national law, the settlement of disputed rights and titles, and the interpretation of treaties. Many a long and bloody war would have been avoided in the old world, had these points been clearly defined, and understood in the same sense by the parties, before a difference of opinion, or a misapprehension, had kindled animosity, and an imaginary injury had prompted to unseasonable aggression.

Lastly, a general Congress is calculated to afford the most perfect guaranty, which can be given, of the *security* of the several states, or of the enjoyment of their rights and privileges as independent sovereignties. As the representatives meet on reciprocal grounds, the very essence of the confederacy will be a pledge to conduct their deliberations, and form their decisions, on principles of perfect reciprocity. It is only upon this basis, indeed, that the Congress can exist at all, and if this be removed, the union will necessarily dissolve. While such an assembly continues, therefore, in the full and active exercise of its delegated powers, the states individually can have no stronger safeguard to their rights as separate governments. A majority in the assembly will rule, but the interests of each member of the confederacy are so nearly the interests of all the others, that a case can hardly occur, in which a majority would come to a decision essentially detrimental to the minority, and not at the same time be equally so to themselves. The extraordinary circumstance already repeated, that is, the remarkable similarity of interests on all subjects, which will be brought before this body, guards its deliberations with a system of checks and balances, which leaves it no power to act, while it acts at all as a united assembly, except for the common good. This must

inevitably be the character of the assembly, unless it can be supposed, that the majority will conspire to accelerate their own ruin.

Navigation and commerce are yet in their infancy in the South American republics ; the laws of nations concerning this kind of intercourse are very imperfectly understood there, as well as the theory of the freedom of trade, and the rights of neutrals in time of war. Obstacles, which have proved most serious to the peace and prosperity of the old countries, will be removed, if the laws of international communication can be defined by a competent tribunal at this period, and be watched over and interpreted as occasions may hereafter require. In the administration of justice, and the general forms of internal government, the laws of Old Spain still prevail throughout Spanish America. These must gradually be reformed, and abolished, and their place supplied by others in unison with the spirit of free constitutions. Such a change must be produced slowly, but it will be done much more surely, when promoted by the influence of a general Congress, which will collectively be acquainted with the condition and wants of the separate republics, and be able to apply such counsels and such remedies as are most needed, and as will command the confidence and respect of the people.

But we aimed only at a few hints on this subject, and have already transgressed our intended limits. As far as we can collect the views of the South American writers, from such of their remarks as we have seen, it may be expected, that the immediate attention of the Congress will be drawn to some or all of the following topics, as enumerated in the *Gaceta de Colombia* of the 27th of February, 1825.

1. To form a solemn compact, or league, by which the states, whose representatives are present, will be bound to unite in prosecuting the war against their common enemy, Old Spain, or against any other power, which shall assist Spain in her hostile designs, or any otherwise assume the attitude of an enemy.

2. To draw up and publish a manifesto, setting forth to the world the justice of their cause, and the relations they desire to hold with other christian powers.

3. To form a convention of navigation and commerce, applicable both to the confederated states, and to their allies.

4. To consider the expediency of combining the forces of the republics, to free the islands of Puerto Rico and Cuba from the yoke of Spain, and, in such case, what contingent each ought to contribute for this end.

5. To take measures for joining in a prosecution of the war at sea, and on the coasts of Spain.

6. To determine whether these measures shall also be extended to the Canary and Phillipine islands.

7. To take into consideration the means of making effectual the declaration of the President of the United States, respecting any ulterior design of a foreign power to colonise any portion of this continent, and also the means of resisting all interference from abroad with the domestic concerns of the American governments.

8. To settle by common consent the principles of those rights of nations, which are in their nature controvertible.

9. To determine on what footing shall be placed the political and commercial relations of those portions of our hemisphere, which have obtained, or shall obtain their independence, but whose independence has not been recognised by any American or European power, as was for many years the case with Hayti.

This is a formidable list of subjects, and enough to show, that, if they should all be discussed, the first Congress at Panamá will not have an idle session. As to the question, whether the United States ought to join in the confederacy, it can hardly be doubted, that such a step would at present be highly inexpedient. Nearly all the topics for primary consideration, are such as pertain exclusively to the local interests of the South American republics; any close alliance, or active interference of the United States, would embarrass, rather than facilitate some of the most important deliberations of the Congress. Besides, our friendly relations with Old Spain render it impossible for us to participate in any measures of war, or hostility, either by counsel or action, which her enemies may think themselves compelled to adopt. The pledge of the President of the United States may be considered as sacred and permanent, so far as the warm and universal approbation of the country, when it was given, may be regarded as clothing it with such a character. In his message to Congress two years ago, speaking of the European powers, President Monroe used

the following dignified and decided language. 'We owe it to candor, and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers, to declare, that we should consider any attempt on their part, to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere, as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power, we have not interfered, and shall not interfere. But with the governments, who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power, in any other light, than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States.' The South Americans cannot want a more hearty and decided expression of interest in their concerns, and of friendly feeling towards them, than is contained in this paragraph. The government of the United States has recognised the independence of all the republics, and formed with them on mutual terms the relations of sovereign and independent nations. Should the great cause of American freedom be assailed, whether at the north or the south, the people of the United States will be ready to take up arms, and unite with all the friends of liberty on the continent in defence of their common rights. At such a crisis there would be strong motives for a union of counsel, in a general congress of delegates collected from every part of America. As it is contemplated, that the Congress of Panamá shall be a permanent body, holding its sessions statedly from time to time, the day may arrive, when the local affairs of the south will be so adjusted, that there will be few national interests in those countries, which are not common to the north. At such a period, also, a union may with great propriety be formed.

But notwithstanding we think it would be manifestly premature and impolitic, for the United States to join the confederacy at this stage of the business, yet there are many reasons why representatives from our government should be present, and take part in such discussions as effect our immediate interests, and be prepared to express the sense of the government on all topics of general concern. Let the acts of the Congress be what they may, since they will apply to all the southern re-

publics, they must ultimately affect the United States ; and it is not easy to foresee or calculate the advantages that would be gained, or the evils that would be averted, in our future national progress, by exercising a timely and salutary influence in the counsels, whose professed design is to form a system of mutual intercourse and political operations, for six distinct governments on the western continent, some of them already powerful, and all possessing the means of rapid growth and strength.

ART. IX.—*Memoir of the Life of Josiah Quincy Junior, of Massachusetts.* By his Son, JOSIAH QUINCY. Boston. 1825. Cummings, Hilliard & Company. 8vo. pp. 498.

THE history of the American revolution, familiar as it is in its prominent features, relates to a subject of so much importance, as may well inspire that general and growing interest, which is observable, to learn the minuter circumstances, that may be communicated by authentic memoirs, respecting the causes, principles, and incidents of the contest, and of the distinguished agents in the great transaction. During the war, all hearts were engaged in active and arduous efforts, to bring it to a successful issue. While such energies were in exercise, the interesting preliminary questions relative to colonial rights and duties, allegiance and supremacy, which had been so amply and ably discussed, were superseded. When peace was declared, and independence secured, the whole country was miserably exhausted by the exertions and sufferings incident to the arduous struggle, and all became earnestly engaged, according to their opportunities, in repairing their wasted fortunes, or in securing the means of subsistence in the various employments, to which they had been accustomed, or in the new pursuits which were opened by the revolution.

To these exertions there were, for a time, many discouraging obstacles. The change of political relations, resulting from the revolution, impeded, in a degree, the prosecution of some of the former branches of business. Time, experience,